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 REVOLT IN VIRGINIA
 Harry Byrd and the 1952 Presidential Election
 by JAMES R. SWEENEY*
 PRIOR to 1952 Virginians had voted for a Republican president only once
 in the twentieth century. In 1928 Herbert Hoover defeated Al Smith by
 24,463 votes. Extraordinary circumstances produced that result. Smith's
 Catholicism and his opposition to Prohibition made him unacceptable to
 many Virginians, including the politically powerful Methodist Bishop James
 Cannon, Jr. By 1952 an entirely different political situation had developed
 in the Democratic Party, but Virginia Democrats were confronted with the
 same problem as in 1928, namely, whether or not to support a presidential
 candidate for whom they had a distinct lack of enthusiasm.' Since the incep-
 tion of the New Deal, the dominant wing of the Virginia Democratic Party,
 headed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., had developed a growing disdain
 for the Democratic Party's presidential candidates. In 1960 Harry Byrd
 described his accustomed position during presidential campaigns: "I have
 found at times that silence is golden." 2
 By 1952 Senator Byrd had become completely estranged from the Demo-
 cratic administration of Harry S. Truman. The Richmond News Leader
 reported a study by the Congressional Quarterly which indicated that Byrd
 was the "least Democratic Democrat." On party-line votes, i.e., votes in which
 a majority of the Democrats voted one way and a majority of Republicans
 the other, Byrd had voted with the Democrats thirty-one percent of the time
 in 1947 and fifty percent in 1948. He opposed the Greek-Turkish aid bill,
 the British loan, the Marshall Plan, and Point Four on grounds of economy
 and overcommitment. In early 1949 President Truman nominated his friend,
 Monrad C. Wallgren, former governor of Washington, to be head of the
 new National Security Resources Board, which was created to take over
 the duties of several wartime agencies such as the War Production Board.
 The nomination had to be confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Com-
 mittee of which Byrd was a member. It was known that the six Republican
 members of the committee intended to vote against Wallgren's confirmation.
 * Dr. Sweeney is an associate professor of history and archivist at Old Dominion University,
 Norfolk, Virginia.
 1 Ralph Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, 1924-1968 (Charlottesville, 1971), p. 23; Virginius Dabney,
 Virginia: The New Dominion (Garden City, New York, 1971), pp. 484-487.
 2 Alden Hatch, The Byrds of Virginia (New York, 1969), p. 503.
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 Senator Byrd announced on March 14 that he had "reluctantly reached the
 conclusion that Mr. Wallgren does not possess the administrative qualifica-
 tions from the standpoint of training, experience and competency to perform
 the extremely important functions" of the chairman of the National Se-
 curity Resources Board. The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected
 Wallgren's nomination by a vote of seven to six with Byrd casting the
 deciding vote.3
 As Senator Byrd's opposition to President Truman's program became more
 pronounced, the president's anger increased. In early May 1949 Byrd called
 for a ten percent cut in Truman's budget. He described Truman's farm
 program as "horrible" and said that the president's long-range spending
 proposals would mean deficits that would destroy the nation's credit or lead
 to confiscatory taxes and depression. On May 9 President Truman told
 Gilbert Harrison, national commander of the American Veterans Commit-
 tee, that there were "too many Byrds in Congress." The senator was infuri-
 ated. "As long as I remain in the Senate," he declared, "I will vote as my
 conscience dictates and to represent the wishes of my constituents." Byrd
 added defiantly that, if the president intended to purge him from the Sen-
 ate because he would not accept Truman's "dictation in matters of legisla-
 tion, then I'll be on hand when the purging starts." 4
 Byrd continued his attacks on the Truman administration from a variety
 of public forums. At his annual apple orchard picnic in 1951 the senator
 stated, "If I were asked today to name the New Deal measures that I favor,
 I could not name a single one." Speaking before the Richmond Chamber
 of Commerce's annual forum on national affairs in November 1951, Byrd
 described the "Truman Democratic Party" as "a greater menace to this
 country than Russia." He added that southern Democrats should take "harsh
 measures" to save their party and their country. Invited to deliver the Jef-
 ferson-Jackson Day address to the Democrats of Georgia on June 25, Byrd
 administered a severe tongue-lashing in a speech entitled "The Truth at
 Washington as I See It." He described the president's budget as "the very
 height of fiscal irresponsibility." If President Truman's proposals on agri-
 culture, medical care, and housing should be adopted, he predicted, "we
 would become a socialist state from which there can be no retreat." Truman's
 civil-rights program constituted "a mass invasion of State's rights." In a ref-
 3 Richmond News Leader, July 22, 1948; Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 15, 16, 1949;
 Washington Post, October 19, 1952; Susan M. Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Congress
 (Columbia, Missouri, 1971), p. 63; Hatch, The Byrds, p. 483.
 Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 10, 1949.
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 erence to the scandals plaguing the administration, Byrd scored "the moral
 deterioration of government under Mr. Truman."
 The senator spoke out again at Selma, Alabama, in early November 1951.
 He declared that the South's political strength derived from the fact that
 it held the balance between the "Trumanites" and the Republicans. The
 South, the last bastion of resistance to Truman's Fair Deal, was challenged
 to save the Democratic Party and restore it as the party of states' rights,
 decency, honesty, and solvency. No longer, in Byrd's words, should "the
 Democrats of the South . . . permit the Trumanites to press down on the
 brow of America the undemocratic crown of waste, of Socialism and of
 dictation from Washington."'
 President Harry S. Truman announced on March 30, 1952, that he
 would not be a candidate for reelection. Political leaders in Virginia, whether
 of the Byrd Organization or anti-Organization factions, approved the presi-
 dent's decision. Francis Pickens Miller, who had begun to give indications
 in February that he would oppose Senator Byrd in the Democratic primary,
 told reporters that he approved the president's decision to retire, but he be-
 lieved that "On every one of the great issues which have confronted him,
 during his administration, the President has made the right decision. He has
 made the right decision on this one." Byrd, exploiting the hostility to Tru-
 man in Virginia, would not let Colonel Miller forget that statement.'
 Senator Byrd seemed to be at the zenith of his political strength in 1952.
 One of the major themes of his campaign against Colonel Miller was the
 issue of 'Trumanism," i.e., support of Truman's Fair Deal policies. Byrd
 asked whether or not Miller was a "Trumanite," and then boasted, "I am
 not a Truman Democrat. I am a true Democrat. There is a vast difference
 between the two." Miller answered, "I am not a Trumanite; I am a Democrat.
 My primary allegiance is . . . to the fundamental principles of the Demo-
 cratic Party in which I believe." The challenger, however, could not dis-
 sociate himself from President Truman. When the ballots were counted on
 July 15, Byrd received 216,438 votes or 62.7 percent, while Miller polled
 only 128,869 votes or 37.3 percent. One of the reasons for Colonel Miller's
 a Washington Evening Star, August 26, 1951; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 9, 1951;
 Congressional Record, 82 Congress, 1 Session (June 27, 1951).
 6 "Political Revolt in the South," United States News and World Report, November 9, 1951,
 pp. 32-33.
 t Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 31, 1952. Miller, a former delegate from Fairfax County,
 had been the candidate of the anti-Organization faction in the 1949 gubernatorial primary. He
 had placed second among four candidates (Peter R. Henriques, "The Organization Challenged:
 John S. Battle, Francis P. Miller, and Horace Edwards Run for Governor in 1949," Virginia
 Magazine of History and Biography, LXXII [1974], 372-406). Miller served in the U.S. Army
 during both World Wars; he had been a colonel on General Eisenhower's staff in World War II.
 182
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:10:51 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Revolt in Virginia
 defeat was unquestionably the mantle of unpopularity he inherited from
 President Truman.8
 Immediately after Senator Byrd's victory, Virginia's Democrats assembled
 for their state convention at Roanoke. The delegates seemed ready to in-
 struct the delegation to the national convention for Senator Richard B.
 Russell of Georgia. The evening before the convention opened, Russell
 declared that a labor-management conference should be called to revise the
 Taft-Hartley Act. Virginia's Democratic leaders were stunned. They regarded
 the Taft-Hartley Act as the keystone of industrial peace. Russell-for-president
 buttons were thrown away; former Governor William M. Tuck removed
 a reference to the Georgian from his keynote speech and the move to en-
 dorse Russell died.'
 Governor Tuck delivered a scathing keynote speech. He referred to the
 leadership of the national Democratic Party in the flamboyant rhetoric Vir-
 ginians had come to expect from him:
 The wastrels and the squanderers who already have debauched our currency and
 who would not hesitate to sacrifice the American people for their own selfish gain.
 . ..The National Democratic Party as at present constituted cannot long endure. Its
 very vitals have been eaten away by an insidious rot, foisted on it by politically ruth-
 less, unprincipled and conscienceless men, more concerned with winning elections
 and a distribution of favors than with preserving a system of free government ....
 Not only the South, but the country as a whole, virtually has been sold into
 Socialism by the architects of Democratic doom who have traded our party principles
 for a mess of Pendergast pottage.
 Tuck concluded by hinting at a possible bolt by the Virginia Democratic
 Party from the Democratic nominee rather than "servilely genuflect to
 Trumanism and 'Fair Dealism.'" 0
 The state convention chose Tuck to succeed state chairman G. Alvin
 Massenburg. It also adopted a resolution, as it did in 1948, to give the
 state central committee the power to recall the state convention after the
 Democratic National Convention to decide whether Virginia's Democrats
 wished to nominate their own presidential candidate. The delegation to the
 8 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 19, 20, 1952; Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, p. 192. For a more
 detailed account of the 1952 Democratic senatorial primary see the author's "Byrd and Anti-Byrd:
 The Struggle for Political Supremacy in Virginia, 1945-1954," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
 University of Notre Dame, 1973.
 9 Benjamin Muse, "Virginia" in Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952-the South, edited
 by Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph Goldman (Baltimore, 1954), p. 19.
 10 Text of speech delivered by William M. Tuck, July 17, 1952, Harry F. Byrd Papers, Uni-
 versity of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
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 national convention departed Roanoke for Chicago without instructions to
 support any candidate for the Democratic nomination.'1
 The Democratic National Convention proved to be a tumultuous and
 nerve-wracking experience for the Virginia delegation. At the Monday even-
 ing session the convention adopted a loyalty pledge, the so-called "Moody
 Amendment" to its temporary rules.
 Be it resolved, that this convention believes in the great American principle of
 majority rule. No delegate shall be seated unless he shall give assurance to the Cre-
 dentials Committee that he will exert every honorable means available to him in any
 official capacity he may have to provide that the nominees of this convention for
 President and Vice-President through their names or those of electors pledged to them,
 appear on the election ballot under the heading, name or designation of the Demo-
 cratic Party. Such assurance shall be given by the chairman of each delegation, and
 shall not be binding upon those delegates who shall so signify to the Credentials Com-
 mittee prior to its report to this Convention.
 The convention adopted an amendment which stated that the resolution
 was not to be considered as contravening any state laws or the instructions
 of state Democratic governing bodies.'2
 The Virginia delegation adamantly opposed taking any such oath. Sena-
 tor A. Willis Robertson and Governor John S. Battle spoke against it on
 the floor of the convention. Senator Byrd described it as "improper, absurd
 and asinine." Specifically the leaders of the Virginia Democratic Party had
 two objections: a) Under Virginia law (Statutes of Virginia, Chapter 357,
 Acts of 1948) any properly certified nominee and electors of the national
 Democratic Party had to appear on the Virginia ballot provided the national
 party officers secured the proper certification in the time after the state
 convention reconvened to nominate its own candidates for president and
 vice president and before the filing deadline; b) The delegation believed it
 was acting under restricted powers because the State Convention had re-
 11 Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, p. 20; J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Harry
 Byrd and the Changing Face of Virpinia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville, 1968), p. 81. The
 resolution was in accordance with the so-called anti-Truman bill adopted by the 1948 Virginia
 General Assembly to show Virginia's displeasure with President Truman's civil-rights program.
 The bill provided that, if the nominee of the national Democratic Party were unacceptable to
 the Virginia Democrats, the state convention could reconvene and instruct the party's presidential
 electors to vote for someone else. The supporters of the national Democratic nominee then
 could get his name on the ballot by obtaining the signatures of one thousand voters and filing
 these with the State Board of Elections. See also James R. Sweeney, "The Golden Silence: The
 Virginia Democratic Party and the Presidential Election of 1948," VMHB, LXXII (1974),
 351-371.
 12 Lewis Preston Collins, "The Memoir and Analysis of Virginia's Participation in the Chicago
 National Democratic Convention," August 6, 1952, pp. 3-4, John S. Battle Executive Papers,
 Virginia State Library, Richmond.
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 served to the State Central Committee the power to reconvene the State
 Democratic Convention after the Chicago convention. The Moody amend-
 ment, in fact, was a weak loyalty oath because it did not require any pledge
 to support the Democratic nominee. The Virginia leaders, however, believed
 that even this weak pledge might be construed as binding them to support
 the party's platform and nominee before either were known. The Moody
 amendment, then, had acquired a symbolic meaning in the minds of the
 Virginians which went beyond the actual words of the resolution as adopted
 by the convention.13
 The Virginia delegation met in a caucus on Tuesday morning, July 22,
 to determine its course of action. After much discussion Tuck moved that
 a committee be appointed to draft a statement explaining Virginia's position.
 Governor Battle as chairman of the delegation appointed a six-man com-
 mittee consisting of Tuck, Lieutenant Governor Lewis Preston Collins,
 Senator Charles R. Fenwick, Delegate George S. Aldhizer, former Congress-
 man Norman R. Hamilton, and Delegate Lewis A. McMurran. The com-
 mittee reported back at another caucus at 4:00 P.M. The caucus approved
 unanimously the committee's reply to the Moody amendment. The com-
 mittee's statement read as follows:
 The Virginia delegation calls attention to the credentials and instructions previously
 filed with this convention and further directs attention to the Statutes of Virginia
 (Chaper 357, Acts of 1948) by which it is mandatory that the names of the nominees
 of this national convention and their electors be placed on the ballot of Virginia under
 the name of the national Democratic Party upon proper certification by the chairman
 of the Democratic National Committee.
 This convention has notice of the freedom of action reserved to this delegation, as
 defined in the resolution of the Virginia Democratic Convention filed with this Con-
 vention and by reason of the laws of Virginia.
 Governor Battle submitted that statement to the Credentials Committee and
 added that the Virginia delegation had unanimously directed that "no loy-
 alty pledge be taken or agreed to by any . . member of the delegation ...
 under the Moody resolution." 14
 As the Wednesday session of the convention began, the chairman of the
 Credentials Committee submitted his report and listed Virginia as one of
 the states which had failed to give the required assurance under the Moody
 13 Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, p. 22; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 22,
 1952; Collins, "Memoir and Analysis," p. 2; James Latimer, "Virginia Politics, 1950-1960,"
 undated manuscript in the possession of Mr. Latimer, p. 49.
 14 Collins, "Memoir and Analysis," pp. 6-11; Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating
 Politics, pp. 22-24.
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 amendment. The temporary chairman of the convention, Governor Paul
 Dever of Massachusetts, ruled that Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana,
 the three nonsigning states, could not vote on the Credentials Committee's
 report. The Democratic National Chairman, Frank McKinney, intervened
 to bring about a compromise. He invited Senator Byrd, Governor Battle, and
 Governors James F. Byrnes of South Carolina and Robert F. Kennon of
 Louisiana to a conference in his office at the rear of the platform. McKinney
 said that the party leaders, having reexamir 1 the states' laws, were now
 prepared to seat Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Governor Battle
 and Senator Byrd were not satisfied with this concession. Battle said that
 the Virginians would "not be a party to any effort to seat this delegation by
 subterfuge." To prevent any misinterpretation of Virginia's stand by the
 public, Battle insisted on appearing before the convention to explain Vir-
 ginia's "stand on principle" and refusal to be "rubber stamps for this con-
 vention or any other convention." '1
 Tuck suggested that Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana make a
 joint inquiry as to their status in the convention. A letter was sent to Sam
 Rayburn, the permanent chairman of the convention, which noted that
 the secretary of the convention had not been instructed to remove the names
 of the three nonsigning states from the permanent rolls. When the roll was
 called, the names of these states would be called. Yet the temporary chair-
 man had ruled that they could not vote in the convention. The three states
 sought a ruling "as to whether or not we are entitled to full participation
 in the deliberations and votes of this convention." Rayburn did not answer
 the letter. He declared that he could not rule until the issue was presented
 on a convention roll call.'6
 Chairman Rayburn's statement set the stage for the dramatic events of
 the Thursday night session. When the roll call of the states to place in nom-
 ination candidates for the presidency reached Louisiana, that state yielded to
 Virginia by pre-arrangement. Governor Battle requested the privilege of
 stating a point of order. Amid much confusion and noise the tall governor
 found it difficult to read his statement into a low microphone. The delega-
 tion insisted that he go to the platform. Having reached the platform, Battle
 was recognized by Chairman Rayburn. The silver-haired governor spoke
 in tones of deep sincerity and conviction. He assured the convention that
 15 Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, pp. 24-25; Collins, "Memoir and
 Analysis," pp. 14-15.
 16Collins, "Memoir and Analysis," pp. 16-17; Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating
 Politics, pp. 25-26.
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 Virginia law required placing the names of the nominees of the Democratic
 National Convention on the ballot. He made his main point in these words:
 What, my Democratic friends, we in Virginia object to is the language of this
 Resolution under which it may be construed, as we construe it, that this Delegation
 and the Democrats of Virginia, insofar as we are able to commit them, would be
 committed to support any future action which might be taken by this Convention.
 We are unwilling, frankly, to take the Pledge .... The great Vice-President of the
 United States said that this was a nation of free people living in a free country, and
 we are simply reserving to ourselves the freedom enunciated by Thomas Jefferson-
 in whose County I happen to live-the great patron saint of this Party, who believed
 in freedom of thought and freedom of action, and we are not going to sign any
 pledge or any commitment which will abridge that freedom which we claim for our-
 selves and believe you would like for yourselves.l7
 It has been alleged that Governor Battle had won a "great foot race" to
 the platform with former Governor Tuck who was "armed with a defiant
 Dixiecrat manuscript." 18 Tuck later disputed this version of the events. He
 has written that "Governor Battle, as chairman of the Virginia delegation
 was our logical spokesman. . . . He alone had the right to address the Con-
 vention at that juncture, hence it is absurd to say that I 'raced him to the
 platform.'" Tuck did follow Battle to the platform, but his purpose was to
 "support and sustain him." In fact, Tuck has recalled, "The sentiments he
 (Battle) expressed in his eloquent, forceful, and effective speech coincided
 with the views I had already expressed to him and others." 19
 Battle's eloquent oration impressed many of the delegates. Representative
 Lansdale G. Sasscer of Maryland moved that the convention regard Battle's
 statement as being substantially in agreement with the Moody amendment.
 If the convention agreed with Sasscer, Virginia could be seated. Senator
 Willis Smith of North Carolina spoke in favor of the motion. Chairman
 Rayburn called for a voice vote. It was impossible to say whether the "ayes"
 or the "noes" had it. Rayburn asked for a roll call of the states. At first it
 seemed that Sasscer's motion would be defeated but delegations began to
 change their votes. The Illinois delegation, declaring its "confidence in Gov-
 ernor Battle," changed from forty-five "no," fifteen "yes" to fifty-two "yes,"
 eight "no." 20 The final tally read 615 in favor of the seating of Virginia,
 7 Collins, "Memoir and Analysis," p. 18; text of Governor Battle's speech, July 24, 1952,
 Battle Executive Papers.
 18Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, p. 82; Virginius Dabney also repeats this story in Virginia: The
 New Dominion, p. 526.
 19 William M. Tuck to the author, April 17, 1972.
 20 The action of the Illinois delegation was prompted by practical political considerations
 rather than sympathy for the Virginians. Colonel Jacob Arvey, the boss of the Chicago Demo-
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 529 against, and 86 not voting. Governor Battle returned to the platform
 and declared, "I shall never betray your confidence." Battle also moved that
 the South Carolina and Louisiana delegations be seated and after certain parli-
 amentry maneuvers these delegations were seated. On the presidential nomi-
 nation Senator Byrd had said, "I'm for Dick Russell . . . and I've no second
 choice in mind now." Virginia proceeded to cast its twenty-eight votes for
 the Georgia senator,21 but Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois won the
 nomination on the third ballot.
 Governor Battle's actions at the Democratic Convention had made him
 a national figure and a Virginia hero. A crowd estimated at three thousand
 cheered him on his return to Richmond. The rejoicing over Virginia's stand
 at the national convention masked deep divisions among the leaders of the
 Byrd Organization over what course to pursue in the presidential campaign
 of Adlai E. Stevenson22 against the Republican nominee, General Dwight
 D. Eisenhower.
 There was an early indication that the "high command" of the Virginia
 Democratic Party would accept Governor Stevenson. On July 31 Senator
 Robertson announced, "I shall . . . vote the straight Democratic ticket next
 November." He described Stevenson as "An honest and able man . . . who
 refused to be placed under obligation either to President Truman or the
 CIO." Robertson's statement disturbed Senator Byrd, who believed it was
 "premature" and showed "a lack of consideration for all of us." Troubled
 by the presidential campaign, the Senator wrote Tuck, "I made the main
 issue of my campaign anti-Trumanism and it is a difficult situation for me
 to meet before the election. I want your advice." G. Fred Switzer, Virginia's
 Democratic National Committeeman, advised Byrd that because of the
 approaching gubernatorial election in 1953, the Democratic State Central
 Committee should set up a campaign committee "with a State Manager in
 behalf of the entire Democratic ticket." He added, "I see no reason to go
 further than this." 23
 cratic organization, later revealed his reasons for changing the Illinois vote. Summoned from
 dinner while the roll call was in progress, Arvey acted quickly to keep the Southerners from
 leaving the convention and thereby decreasing the total convention vote, and giving Senator
 Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, whom Arvey opposed, a better chance to win. Arvey's choice for
 the presidential nomination, Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, was in seclusion and
 offered no advice to the Illinois delegation.
 21 Collins, "Memoir and Analysis," pp. 19-22; Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating
 Politics, p. 26; Allan P. Sindler, "The Unsolid South: A Challenge to the Democratic National
 Party" in The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in American Politics, edited by Alan F. Westin (New
 York, 1962), pp. 260-267; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 21, 1952.
 22 Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, p. 27.
 23 Statement of A. Willis Robertson, July 31, 1952, A. Willis Robertson Papers, Swem
 Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg; Harry F. Byrd to G. Fred Switzer, August
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 The Democratic State Central Committee met on August 28. The grow-
 ing support for Stevenson among Democratic politicians had eliminated the
 possibility of calling back the state convention. Tuck, however, resigned as
 state chairman because he was "unwilling to choose a definite course" on
 the presidential election. Tuck has recalled that "about this time" he and
 Senator Byrd "tentatively agreed not to say anything at all in regard to the
 presidential campaign." The Committee chose T. Nelson Parker, an attor-
 ney from Richmond, to be the new state chairman. He was to open campaign
 headquarters and work for all the Democratic candidates, "state, national
 and local." Parker recalled that he and his associates campaigned vigor-
 ously for Stevenson. They established headquarters in the various sections
 of the state and spent all the money they could get-a total of twenty-one
 thousand dollars-in efforts to elect the Democratic nominee.24
 In mid-August an interesting exchange of correspondence occurred among
 Governors Battle and Stevenson and Senator Byrd. The senator wrote Gov-
 ernor Battle on August 14 that he had information from an "entirely credible
 source" that Governor Stevenson would announce his support for the fol-
 lowing policies: a) a modification of Senate Rule 22 on unlimited debate;
 b) the immediate passage of federal legislation for repeal of the poll tax;
 c) the immediate passage of an anti-lynching law; d) the establishment of a
 Fair Employment Practices Commission; and e) federal aid to education.
 Byrd concluded, "In other words, I am told that he promised the President
 that he would support practically everything that we now know under the
 head of Trumanism." Governor Battle wrote to Adlai Stevenson to learn
 whether Byrd's allegations were correct. Without mentioning the senator's
 name, Battle informed Stevenson of the rumors which had reached his ears.
 The governor closed with the remark that "some expression from you would
 be extremely helpful." 25
 Governor Stevenson replied most cautiously that he was "steering as best
 I can, albeit clumsily, between the countless pitfalls on this intricate and
 unfamiliar course." He knew that a "multitude of views" had been expressed
 about his positions. "As to the civil rights business," Stevenson continued,
 "I wish we had a chance to talk." He was convinced that the "sledge ham-
 mer approach has been all wrong." A compulsory FEPC could not be
 2, 1952, and Switzer to Byrd, August 8, 1952, G. Fred Switzer Papers, University of Virginia
 Library, Charlottesville; Byrd to William M. Tuck, August 1, 1952, Byrd Papers.
 24 Muse, "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, p. 27; Tuck to J. R. Sweeney, Novem-
 ber 27, 1972; personal interview with T. Nelson Parker, April 3, 1972.
 25Harry F. Byrd to John S. Battle, August 14, 1952, Battle Executive Papers; Battle to
 Adlai E. Stevenson, Jr., August 19, 1952, Byrd Papers.
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 enacted into law, and much could be done without it. The candidate stated
 that Senator Russell felt "confident that the South will support a poll tax
 constitutional amendment and that an anti-lynching law, although obsolete,
 could readily be enacted." If, in addition, "something on the employment
 discrimination line" could be done, "I think we will have demonstrated
 both our purposes and direction as a party and have fully satisfied the ex-
 pectations of the more moderate and understanding Negro leaders." On fed-
 eral aid to education the governor had "not formulated my views conclu-
 sively," but, he added, "we may have to help medical schools and very
 soon." Stevenson assured Battle that none of the issues which the Virginian
 had listed had even been mentioned when he had met with President Tru-
 man. Governor Battle forwarded his correspondence with Stevenson to Sena-
 tor Byrd. Stevenson's positions must not have displeased Governor Battle
 too much, because, after the State Central Committee meeting in late August,
 he endorsed Stevenson's candidacy and described him as a "high type, Chris-
 tian gentleman." 26
 The anti-Organization leaders cooperated with the State Central Com-
 mittee in its campaign for Stevenson. Francis Pickens Miller informed
 Wilson Wyatt of Stevenson's national headquarters that Nelson Parker was
 "an honest man and... he is doing the very best he can." Miller had decided
 that the proper strategy for the anti-Organization people was "to encourage
 Byrd Organization men to carry the ball, and for us to give them our active
 support." He assumed that if many Organization men supported Stevenson
 aggressively, and if the anti-Organization leaders roused the enthusiasm
 of their supporters, then Stevenson could carry Virginia. Miller, Robert
 Whitehead, and Martin Hutchinson, however, became disillusioned very
 quickly with the campaign being conducted for Stevenson by the Demo-
 cratic State Central Committee. They believed that they were being kept
 in the background and not given sufficient speaking engagements. Miller
 concluded that Parker's campaign for Stevenson was "a holding operation"
 giving the national Democratic Party the impression that a campaign was
 being waged while at the same time preventing Whitehead, Miller, and
 Hutchinson "from giving any public leadership to our people." Parker has
 denied that the anti-Organization men were placed in a subordinate role
 during the campaign. He consulted with Miller and Whitehead "on various
 occasions" during the campaign. Stevenson's position in Virginia was such
 26 Adlai E. Stevenson, Jr., to John S. Battle, August 23, 1952, Battle to Harry F. Byrd, August
 27, 1952, Byrd Papers; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 29, 1952.
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 that, as Parker has said, "we were very anxious to have any help we could
 get." Some of the Organization's supporters even accused Parker of favoring
 the anti-Organization men because he utilized their services at all.27
 Parker invited Governor Stevenson to speak in Richmond. The candidate
 spoke on September 20 before a crowd of five thousand, which overflowed
 the Mosque. Governor Battle and Senator Robertson were present at the
 rally, but Senator Byrd was absent. George Kelley, a political writer for the
 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, reported that several people believed that Virginia
 would be "in the bag" for Stevenson, if Byrd would only endorse him.28
 Senator Byrd announced on October 13 that he would make an address
 on the "Issues of the Campaign" on Friday evening, October 17. Miller
 informed an aide at Stevenson's national headquarters of Byrd's speech. He
 wrote, "No one in Richmond has the slightest inkling of what he is going
 to say. If he throws his full weight on one side or the other, his speech may
 very well decide the outcome of the election in Virginia." A few days before
 Byrd's announcement Governor Battle had spoken at Lebanon, in Russell
 County, and had praised Stevenson for his forthrightness. He had declared,
 "Yes, we have a man of ability, experience, integrity and high courage. I
 shall support him and I commend him to you." Byrd telephoned Tuck on
 Sunday evening, the day after Battle's speech. Tuck later recalled that Byrd
 believed "we should explain to the people of Virginia through some method,
 either by a public speech or by a newspaper or radio statement, why we had
 not endorsed Stevenson." Tuck replied that he would do whatever the sena-
 tor thought best. Byrd suggested that a statement on the radio would be
 best and that Tuck should speak first and "after he spoke there would be
 no interest in what I had to say." 29
 After making his difficult decision to speak out, Senator Byrd wrote to his
 intimate friend, Frank Wysor of Pulaski County, that because of the gov-
 ernor's speech at Lebanon, "I have reluctantly reached the conclusion that
 I should make a statement by radio on Friday night. I feel this will have
 some bad repercussions, but I will handle it the best I can." The basic ques-
 tion, as Byrd saw it, was that "everything that the (Democratic) candidates
 27 Francis Pickens Miller to Wilson W. Wyatt, September 24, 1952, Francis Pickens Miller
 Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville; Miller to Wyatt, October 21, 1952,
 Martin A. Hutchinson Papers, University of Virginia Library; T. Nelson Parker to the author,
 August 2, 1972. Hutchinson, an attorney in Richmond, had challenged Byrd unsuccessfully in
 the 1946 senatorial primary. Whitehead was an independent Democratic delegate from Nelson
 County.
 28 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 21, 1952.
 29 Francis Pickens Miller to Wilson W. Wyatt, October 14, 1952, Miller Papers; Norfolk
 Virginian-Pilot, October 12, 1952; William M. Tuck to J. R. Sweeney, November 27, 1972.
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 and the platform stand for were made issues in my campaign, and I was
 nominated in opposition to these measures." 30
 Harry Byrd spoke over a state-wide radio network on Friday evening,
 October 17, 1952. He began, "In my twenty years in the Senate I have
 fought many lone battles. Rightly or wrongly I have not always trod the
 popular road." He attacked the Truman Administration for its fiscal poli-
 cies, the proposed repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, and its civil-rights pro-
 gram. In the senatorial primary, Byrd continued, "I was nominated as a
 Virginia Democrat and during the campaign repeatedly stated that I was not
 a Truman Democrat." He declared that Trumanism had been the dominant
 issue of the senatorial campaign and was again the most important issue of
 the presidential election. If he were to support a candidate urging a con-
 tinuation of Truman's policies, Byrd declared, he could not be true to the
 pledges which he made in the primary campaign. He said in conclusion: "I
 will not, and cannot, in good conscience, endorse the Democratic platform
 or the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket. Endorsement means to recommend, and
 this I cannot do." 9
 Tuck delivered his speech over a state-wide radio network on October 22.
 He described Governor Stevenson as "a Truman dominated candidate,"
 who would seek to enact the Truman program if he were elected. Stevenson
 had "succeeded in attracting to his standard a motley collection of many
 of the most evil influences in America" such as the Americans for Demo-
 cratic Action and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
 People. He concluded:
 I am a Democrat. I always intend to be a Democrat. I have not shifted my views on
 fundamental questions. Candor compels me to say that the Eisenhower platform in
 many vital particulars as well as the Eisenhower candidacy more nearly conforms to
 traditional principles of the Democratic Party than does the Truman platform or the
 Truman candidate.
 I cannot endorse Stevenson and become affiliated with his campaign.32
 The anti-Organization Democrats were shocked by Byrd's speech. Colo-
 nel Miller declared, "The implications of Senator Byrd's statement for the
 Democratic Party in Virginia are so serious that it will be some time before
 the full consequences of his action can be determined." Miller accused
 Byrd of betraying the party and pledged that "Under the leadership of
 30 Harry F. Byrd to J. Frank Wysor, October 14, 1952, Byrd Papers.
 31 Text of speech by Harry F. Byrd, October 17, 1952, Byrd Papers.
 32 Text of speech by William M. Tuck, October 22, 1952, Byrd Papers.
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 Governor Battle ... we will carry Virginia for Stevenson and Sparkman in
 spite of Harry Byrd." Robert Whitehead believed that Byrd "lacked the
 courage of his convictions" because "he stopped short of saying that he was
 voting the Republican ticket." Henry Howell, an attorney in Norfolk, wrote
 that Byrd was obligated for his election to the Republican voters, and in his
 speech he had "paid his debt to the Taft wing of the Republican Party
 which will control General Eisenhower if he is elected."33
 The press generally applauded Senator Byrd's speech. The Richmond
 Times-Dispatch described the address as "a credit to his [Byrd's] integrity"
 in which he demonstrated "a devotion to principle in keeping with his long
 and courageous career of public service." The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
 praised Byrd for his "sincerity and conviction." In the opinion of the Lynch-
 burg News, it was "one of the best speeches the Senator had ever made." 34
 The speech undoubtedly destroyed whatever chance Adlai Stevenson
 might have had for carrying Virginia. Parker later remarked that Byrd had
 informed him that he could not support Stevenson. The people at Demo-
 cratic State Headquarters had been hoping for another "golden silence" on
 Byrd's part and they were most upset by the senator's speech. State Senator
 A. E. S. Stephens of Smithfield, who had been nominated to succeed the
 deceased Lieutenant Governor L. Preston Collins, campaigned vigorously
 for Stevenson. He later said that if the Byrd Organization had actively sup-
 ported Stevenson, the Illinois governor would have carried Virginia. Lewis
 F. Powell, Jr., a prominent attorney in Richmond and a supporter of Eisen-
 hower, wrote Senator Byrd, "I believe your speech was a turning point in
 the campaign, as it influenced a number of other leaders as well as countless
 thousands of voters." 35
 The Byrd Organization was much divided as election day approached.
 Speaker E. Blackburn Moore of the House of Delegates made a statement
 similar to the broadcast speeches of Byrd and Tuck. He declared that, "Be-
 lieving as I do in the principles of government asserted by the 1952 Virginia
 Democratic Convention, I feel that I cannot conscientiously recommend
 or endorse the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket." Moore was a neighbor of Sena-
 33 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1952; Robert Whitehead to Francis Pickens Miller,
 October 18, 1952, Miller Papers; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 21, 1952. Henry Howell
 later served in both houses of the General Assembly, was elected lieutenant governor of Virginia
 in 1971, and was an unsuccessful candidate for governor in 1969, 1973, and 1977.
 34 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1952; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 19, 1952;
 Lynchburg News, October 18, 1952.
 35 Parker interview; personal interview with A. E. S. Stephens, March 6, 1972; Lewis F.
 Powell, Jr., to Harry F. Byrd, November 6, 1952, Byrd Papers. Powell was appointed by
 President Richard M. Nixon to the United States Supreme Court in 1971.
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 tor Byrd in Berryville, a fellow apple-grower, and the senator's favorite
 hiking companion. Many other high Democratic officials, however, had en-
 dorsed Stevenson's candidacy. In addition to Senator Robertson and Gover-
 nor Battle prominent Democrats supporting Stevenson included Congressmen
 Howard W. Smith, Watkins Abbitt, Porter Hardy, Jr., J. Vaughan Gary,
 Thomas Stanley, Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., and State Sena-
 tor A. E. S. Stephens.36
 Dwight D. Eisenhower carried Virginia in 1952 with 349,037 votes
 (56.3 percent) to 268,677 votes (43.4 percent) for Adlai E. Stevenson.
 Eisenhower carried sixty-five of Virginia's counties to Stevenson's thirty-
 three. Stevenson's strength was concentrated in a block of four counties in
 southwest Virginia, and in nineteen counties across the Southside.'3 Of
 twenty-nine independent cities Eisenhower carried twenty-five. Stevenson
 won Hopewell, Newport News, Portsmouth, and South Norfolk. Senator
 Byrd believed the result in Virginia was "magnificent." "I do not think," he
 wrote, "we will be treated with such contempt by the National Party in the
 future." On election night Harold S. Vanderbilt of New York had tele-
 phoned his congratulations to Senator Byrd and General Eisenhower. He
 said to the president-elect, "General, I have just had Senator Harry Byrd
 of Virginia on the 'phone and he told me that, in his opinion, Virginia was
 in the bag, and he asked me to tell you how glad he was." Eisenhower re-
 plied, "That man is a wonderful guy, isn't he?" 38
 In its postelection analysis the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot stressed the im-
 portance of the attitude of Virginia's leaders in explaining Virginia's "historic
 vote." Not only had the state given its electoral vote to a Republican, Gen-
 eral Eisenhower, but also three Republicans, Joel Broyhill, Richard Poff, and
 William Wampler, were elected to the House of Representatives from Vir-
 ginia's Tenth, Sixth, and Ninth Districts, respectively. The Virginian-Pilot
 believed that General Eisenhower, possessing "fine merits in his own right"
 and burdened with "no long record of Republicanism to embarrass tradi-
 tional Democrats," provided an attractive alternative for conservative Vir-
 ginians to Governor Stevenson, who failed to dissociate himself from the
 86 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 28, 1952; Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, p. 83; Muse,
 "Virginia," Presidential Nominating Politics, p. 28. Eight of the nine members of Virginia's
 delegation in the United States House of Representatives supported Stevenson. Representative
 Burr Harrison of the Seventh District (the Shenandoah Valley) remained neutral.
 s7 The four southwestern counties were Buchanan, Dickenson, Russell, and Wise. The South-
 side counties were Nansemond, Southampton, Greensville, Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Halifax,
 PSttsylvania, Henry, Patrick, Campbell, Appomattox, Buckingham, Charlotte, Lunenburg, Din-
 widdie, Prince George, Surry, Sussex, Isle of Wight.
 38 Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, pp. 181-184; Harry F. Byrd to R. H. Gore, November 5, 1952,
 Harold S. Vanderbilt to Byrd, November 5, 1952, Byrd Papers.
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 Fair Deal policies of President Truman. Colonel Francis Pickens Miller
 offered an election analysis of his own. He stated that "the Democratic Party
 in Virginia has been sold down the river by some of its erstwhile leaders."
 "The Trojan horse tactics of these renegades" had cost the Democratic Party
 three seats in Congress. "The job now," Miller concluded, "is to reconstruct
 a Democratic Party in Virginia under the leadership that can be trusted." 89
 Intraparty strife in the Democratic household has continued in Virginia
 since 1952 accompanied by a resurgence of the state's Republican Party. The
 liberal elements have captured control of the Democratic Party while con-
 servatives have drifted into independent or Republican status. Since 1952
 the Democratic presidential candidate has carried Virginia only once-in
 1964 when Lyndon B. Johnson defeated Barry M. Goldwater by 76,704
 votes. In 1972 Richard Nixon received 67.8 percent of the vote while the
 Democratic nominee George McGovern polled only 30.1 percent. The
 Republican Party had captured and retained the governship and had in-
 creased its share of Virginia's delegation in the House of Representatives to
 seven out of ten seats by 1973. Senator Harry F. Byrd's stand in the 1952
 presidential election had been most significant. He had raised the standard
 of a political revolt that is still going on in the Old Dominion a quarter
 century later.'°
 39 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 5, 1952; statement by Francis Pickens Miller, November
 5, 1952, Miller Papers.
 40Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, p. 24; Offcial Election Results-1972 (Richmond, 1973), p. 7;
 Nixon received 988,493 votes to 438,887 for McGovern.
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